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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
.JAMES C. WHITTAKER 
Sri'ATEMI<~NT OF THE FACTS 
Case No. 
7181 
The controlling facts so far as they relate to the 
plaintiff's side of the case are not in dispute. They are 
for the most part matters of record. If tho mortgage 
under which plaintiff claims is valid, the record shows 
beyond all question that the plaintiff has a perfectly 
good title to the 60 acres of primary or class A water 
right in 'Thistle creek and its tributaries which he claims. 
It also shows that both appellants are estopped by mort-
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gage, by their disclaimers and by judgment to raise the 
question of the validity of the mortgage and that the 
validity of the mortgage is a matter which has been 
determined by the judgment of the court in case No. 
2888. 
The plaintiff's title is based upon a mortgage which 
was given by Richard H. Spencer to W. H. Hadlock, the 
state bank commissioner, and which was foreclosed in 
case No. 2888. This mortgage is plaintiff's Exhibit E. 
(1'r. 26, 37). 
rl'he waters of Thistle creek were appropriated by 
diversion and beneficial use many years ago. There was 
a decree rendered in the district court at Provo in Ter-
ritorial days which settled the rights of the appropria-
tors as of that time. rl'lten in l!J20 there was another de-
cree rendered in the di:,;trict court in Sanpete county, 
Utah, again adjudicating those same water rights. 1'his 
decree is copied in the cornplaint an<l also in the find-
ings of facts. The ease in whieh that decree was ren-
dered hears the numher 140G. (See Findings of Facts.) 
It was decreed in ease No. HOG that Richard H. 
Spencer was then the owner o[ the right to the use of 
448 acres of primary or class A right out of a total of 
1728 such rights on the stream, and that his water right 
had not then heen conveyed to the Indianola Irrigation 
Company, a corporation, as many of these rights had 
been, and that there were no stock certificates outstand-
ing for the Richard H. Spencer rights. (See Finclings 
of Facts.) 
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The evidence shows that there were only 1728 acres 
of land under irrigation in Thistle Valley; and in ease 
No. 1406 the court decreed that these 1728 acres of 
primary or class A rights embraced all the waters of 
tho stream. But there were also class B rights, which, 
however, can be used only from the beginning of the ir-
rigation season to June 15, while tho high waters are 
flowing in the stream. (Tr. 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 
171,172,173,174) 
The evidence also shows that it has always been 
customary for the water users to take all the water they 
need or can use for their lands while the stream is high; 
but as the flow diminishes they use fewer ditches, com-
bine the stream flow, and take their water in turns. It 
has been customary ever since the organization of the 
Indianola Irrigation Company, in 1918, for the water 
master of the corporation each year to make out tickets 
for all the water users, both those who had conveyed 
their rights to the corporation taking stock certificates 
as evidence of their rights as well as those who had not 
so conveyed their rights and had no stock certificates 
in the corporation, showing when each owner's turns 
commenced and ended. ( Tr. 165-175) 
Tho evidence also shows that no land owner was 
obliged to use his water right on any particular land. 
On the contrary, he had the right to and did irrigate any 
land from any ditch according to his own desires, trans-
ferring from land to land and from ditch to ditch at will. 
(Tr. 165-175, 177,789, 159) 
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Many years ago Richard H. Spencer acquired from 
their Indian owners four tracts of land or farms. They 
are: 
(1) The Jim Ownup or Old Jim land, being 
SE% of Section 8, containing 160 acres. 
(2) The Wapitch farm, being S1;2NE1)!, and 
NYzSE% of Section 5, containing 160 acres. 
(3) The Wansitz farm, being Slj2 NW14 and 
NYzSW%, Section 5, containing 160 acres. 
( 4) The Ponawats farm, being Lot 4 of Section 
5 and Lot 1 of Section 6, containing 77 acres. 
( 5) Richard H. Spencer also owned a ci,ty lot in 
Indianola containing 3 acres. 
It appears from the testimony of Lyman H. Seely 
that when the decree was entered in case No. 1406 Rich-
ard H. Spencer was a'llowed water rights of the pri-
mary or Class A description for these lands as follows: 
160 acres 
70 acres 
160 acres 
55 acres 
3 acres 
448 acres. 
(Tr. 360-365) 
on the Jim Ownup farm. 
on the Wapitch farm. 
on the Wansitz farm. 
on the Ponawats farm. 
on the lot in town. 
But it should be remembered that he had the right 
to use this water upon any of his land and that he did 
in fact sometimes use it all on one tract or another and 
that when the stream was at low flow he combined his 
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water into one or two ditches and used it wherever on 
any of the land as needed. 'rhe evidence also shows that 
the 3 acres allocated to the city lot had been used on 
the vVapitch land and had never been used on the lot 
in town. Seely also testified that in the decree in No. 
140G Spencer had been allocated only 55 acres for the 
Ponawats farm, that this farm had used 80 acres of 
water right but before that decree was entered Spencer 
had sold and conveyed 25 acres of that water right to 
one vVall, so that when the decree was made Spencer was 
allocated only 55 acres of primary right for the 77 
acres in the Ponawa ts farm. ( Tr. 360-365) 
The evidence concerning Richard H. Spencer's mort-
gages and deeds of transfer of his 448 acres of primary 
or Class A rights comes from the records in the office 
of the county recorder. The deeds and mortgages with 
which the plaintiff is concerned, with their dates and the 
dates of record, are as follows: 
First: The HugentObler mortgage. 
This mortgage is dated January 5, 1922; it is re-
corded as of January 12, 1922. It runs from Richard 
H. Spencer and his wife to Simon Hugentobler. It covers 
the land in the Ponawats farm and 55 acres of primary 
or class A water right in 'Thistle creek. 
'l1he mortgage itself does not state whether or not 
the water right mortgaged is water right used for the 
irrigation of the mortgaged land. In fact, so far as the 
terms of the mortgage are concerned, it cannot be de-
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termined whether or not there is any of the land which 
has ever been irrigated. 
Second: The Federal Building and Loan Associa-
tion mortgage. 
This mortgage is dated November 9, 1926. It was re-
corded November 9, 1926. It runs from Hichard H. Spen-
cer to the Federal Building and Loan Association. It 
covers the .Jim Ownup 160 acres of land in Section 8 and 
parts of the vVapitch lands in Section 5, and 285 acres 
of primary water rights. It also appears in connection 
with this transaction that Richard H. Spencer purported 
to assign to Federal Building and Loan Association 
285 shares of Class A stock in the Indianola Irrigation 
Company. But it must be remembered that at this time 
Richard H. Spencer owned no shares of stock in that 
corporation representing any of the water rights with 
this action is concerned, namely the 448 acres of right 
clecree<l to him in ease No. l40G, all(l that there was 
then no certificate outstanding for any of those rights. 
'l'hird: The Hadlock mortgage. 
This mortgage is dated October 16, 1931, and was 
recorded October 21, 1931. It is executed by Hichard 
H. Spencer and others and rnns to vV. H. Hadlock, the 
state hank commissioner. It is witnessed and notarized 
hy \Vill L. Hoyt. It is in the statutory form of mortgages 
in use in this state. It covers 280 acres of land in Sec-
tion :3, with the water right used thereon, and contains 
this speeial paragraph relative to the water right which 
the plaintiff now claims: 
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"Tog-ether with all rights of en ry kind and 
nature, however evi<lenced, to the use of water, 
ditches, and canals for tile inigation of said 
premises to which the mortgag·ors or said prem-
ises are now or may hereafter become entitled; 
whether represented by certificates of' stock or 
otherwise, and together with sixty (60) shares 
or acres of water right owned by H. H. Spencer 
in the waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek 
and Hock Creeks in addition to waters now used 
for the irrigation of the above described lands." 
(Tr. 26) 
The astonishing suggestion is advanced by counsel 
for appellants that this mortgage might have been in-
tended by the parties to be a second mortgage on Rich-
ard H. Spencer's 60 acres of primary water right. But it 
is to be noted that there is nothing whatever in the in-
strument itself nor is there any evidence in the record 
to support such suggestion. 
The evidence shows, without dispute or conflict that 
the only water right which the bank commissioner ob-
tained as security by this mortgage is the 60 acres be-
longing to Richard H. Spencer. The water right which 
had been decreed in connection with the land in Section 
3 was then owned by one of the other mortgagors, there 
was a stock certificate in the Indianola Irrigation Com-
pany then outstanding to represent the same, and the 
bank commissioner did not receive possession of said 
certificate; but it was later pledged to a bank in Span-
ish Fork, the pledge was foreclosed, and the stock at the 
time of the trial was owned by 'l'anner. (Tr. 390, 393) 
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The total number of acres or shares of the primary 
or class A water rights covered by the three mortgages 
above mentioned is 400, leaving, as of October 16, 1931, 
the date of the Hadlock mortgage, 48 acres out of Rich-
ard H. Spencer's 448 acres sti'll in his name and free 
from mortgage or other lien. 
Now, please hear in mind that not until November 
25, 1931, had Richard H. Spencer conveyed any of his 
448 acres to the Indianola Irrigation Company; and not 
until that day did he have any certificate of stock in that 
corporation to represent any of his water right. Also 
please bear in mind the fact that all of the mortgages 
above mentioned were executed and recorded prior to 
the date of any other instrument involved in this action 
affecting the 448 acres of primary water right of Rich-
ard H. Spencer's. 
Fourth: The deed to Indianola Irrigation Company. 
'There is a dispute concerning the date of the execu-
tion of this deed. Appellants claim it was signed on June 
1, 1D18, or .June 21, l!H8. rrlte evidence shows that it 
was signed by Richard H. Spencer and his wife on No-
vember 25, 1931, which is the date when they signed the 
separate slip of paper which is attached to the instru-
ment. The court found as a fact in case No. 2888 and 
also in this case that Richard H. Spencer signed that 
slip of paper on November 25, 1931. 
But he the fact as it may as to when they executed 
this deed, the fact is beyond all question that it was not 
recorded until April4, 1936. 
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So that the three mortgages above mentioned take 
priority over this deed. 
This deed purports to convey to the Indianola Ir-
rigation Company HiO acres of primary water right; and 
upon the basis of this deed the irrigation company is-
sued a certificate for HiO shares of its class A stock, 
which was afterward surrendered to the corporation 
and cancelled and in lieu thereof certificates 72 and 
73 were issued. 
Fifth : The Federal Building and Loan mortgage 
is foreclosed. 
The next step involving Spencer's 448 acres of water 
rights which is important is the foreclosure of the Fed-
eral Building and Loan Association mortgage. 'This 
was done in case No. 2730. 
Federal became the purchaser at the foreclosure sale 
of the land and water rights described in its mortgage. 
Federal afterward conveyed the title to 285 acres of the 
primary water right to the Indianola Irrigation Com-
pany and received in lieu thereof a certificate for 285 
shares of its class A stock, now represented by certifi-
cates No. 84 and No. 8G. 
Sixth: Hugentobler and Hadlock mortgages fore-
closed. 
The Hugentobler and Hadlock mortgages were fore-
closed in case No. 2888. In that case all of the defaml-
ants in this action, except Irwin l\L Price, were parties 
defendant. 
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At the time the judgment and decree of foreclosure 
was entered in that case certificates No. 72 and No. 73 
\Vere outstanding, and, as the court found, were then in 
the possession of Richard H. Spencer. 
The decree in that case foreclosed all of the defend-
ants in the action of all their rights in and to the water 
rights covered by the Hugentobler and Hadlock mort-
gages; and in that case the court found as a fact that 
the water rights which wore included in the Hugentobler 
and Hadlock mortgages were a part of 1the same water 
right which Richard H. Spencer had deeded to the In-
dianola Irrigation Company on November 25, 1931, and 
which were the water rights which supported certificates 
72 and 73. 
'!'he court, however, did not do as it should have 
dono, namely, order 72 and 73 to he surrendered up and 
cancelled and a now certificate issued to whoever had 
a rig-ht to the 45 shares remaining after deducting the 
fi;) acres for Hngentohlor and the 60 acres for Had-
lock from the HiO acres; but the court did reserve for 
future determination what to do ahout those certificates. 
At tho foroelosure sale in ease No. 2888 Hugcntobler 
l1ccame the purchaser of the lands and water rights cov-
ered hy his mortgage. 'rhis is the land and water right 
now owned hy Quo .T onsen. At the sale Hadlock became 
tho purchaser of the land and water right covered by 
his mortgage. This is the water right now owned by the 
plaintiff. 
11 
Hugentobler and Hadlock received their sheriff's 
deeds on the foreclosure sale in the late fall of 1937, after 
the irrigation season. 
Thereafter, beginning with the irrigation season of 
19i38 and coming right down to the time this case was 
tried, whenever the bank commissioner and his succes-
sor in title attempted to make use of the water right, in 
the turns assigned by the water master for their use, 
the Spencers interfered with their dams and took the 
water themselves, claiming the right to do so because 
they said Irwin M. Price owned certificates No. 72 and 
No. 73 and they had some arrangement with him per-
mitting them to use the water represented by those 
certificates. (Tr. 209-2'11) 
Since Irwin M. Price was not a party to case No. 
2888, it was imposible to reach him in that case, so the 
plaintiff brought this action, naming him as one of the 
defendants and also bringing in all of the defendants in 
that action to settle the rights which had been brought 
into dispute again by this claim now asserted by Rich-
ani H. an<l .John Edison Spencer that Price was the 
owner of the stock certificates. 
Of course neither Hugentobler nor Hadlock ever 
claimed any interest in certificates No. 72 and 73. They 
claimed adversely to those certificates. They claimed and 
still claim that when their mortgages were foreclosed the 
water rights which underlay those certificates were taken 
away from the Indianola Irrigation Company, leaving 
that corporation in the unhappy situation of having cer-
12 
tificates for 115 shares of its class A stock outstanding 
with no foundation in water rights to support them. 
In this action Richard H. Spencer and John Edison 
Spencer disclaimed all interest in all the water rights 
mentioned and described in the plaintiff's complaint. 
Both signed the disclaimer personally and verified the 
same before their attorney Lewis Larson. That dis-
claimer still stands in the records of this action and 
it is still binding upon those defendants. 
At the time Richard H. Spencer and John Edison 
Spencer filed their disclaimer, there was also filed by 
Mr. Larson an answer on behalf of the defendant Irwin 
J\L Price, which includes a disclaimer and an affirmative 
defense. This answer is not signed by Price nor is it 
verified by him. rrhere is no evidence in the record which 
indicates that Price ever knew that this answer had 
been filed in his behalf, but there is evidence suggesting 
the contrary. 
\Ve hasten to disclaim any intention to impugne the 
good faith of Mr. Larson in filing this answer and state 
that we feel that he (lid so in the belief that Richard 
H. and John l1Jdison were authorized by Price to repre-
sent him in retaining Mr. Larson to represent him in 
this action. 
In his affirmative defense to the plaintiff's com-
plaint Irwin J\L Price is made to allege: 
"That he does claim lGO shares of the Pri-
mary water of Indianola Irrigation Company, con-
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veyed to the Indianola Inigation Company by 
H. H. Spencer, and appropriated by sai(l H. H. 
Spencer and his predecessors in interest upon that 
particular tract of land described as follows; to-
wit: 
rrhe south half of the northwest quarter, and the 
north half of the southwest quarter of Section 5, in 
rrownship 12 South, Range 4 ]1Jast of Salt Lake 
Meridian, containing 160 acres, in Sanpete County, 
State of Utah, which said water was heretofore, 
in about the year lD;H, conveyed by deed from 
R. H. Spencer to the Indianola Inigation Com-
pany, for which certificate of said Indianola Ir-
rigation Company, No. 57, was issued to said R. 
H. Spencer, and which certificate was thereafter 
split and issued in the form of two certificates 
known as certificates No. 72 and 7:3 of the In-
dianola Irrigation Company, and which waters 
so evidenced, were appropriated by said R. H. 
Spencer and his predecessors in interest, upon 
said described lands in Section 5, more than sixty 
years next prior to the commencement of this 
action, and this defendant has never diverted, or 
attempted to divert or authorized any one to 
divert any waters other than those ~waters so ap-
propriatl,d, which said waters at the time of said 
diversion, were owned and are now owned by this 
defendant.'' 
This answer is signed by Lewis Larson as attorney 
for Irwin l\L Price and was verified by Mr. Larson on 
April 22, 1942. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Price Affidavit 
Inasmuch as the only right which Richard H. Spen-
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cer and John Edison Spencer have ever claimed to the 
Hugentobler and \:Vhittaker water rights, since the exe-
cution of the sheriff's deeds thereon in the foreclosure 
sale in case No. 2888, is based upon their claim that 
Irwin M. Price was the owner of certificates 72 and 73 
and they had an understanding with him for the use of 
the water right represented by those certificates, it is 
no wonder their camp was thrown into confusion and 
consternation upon the filing of the Irwin M. Price af-
fidavit. 
rche utter falsehood of their claim was exposed by 
that afficlavit. Having themselves disclaimed all interest 
in all the water rights described in the plaintiff's com-
plaint, ancl having tal;:en Hugentobler's and Hadlock's 
water turns uncler the claim that Price owned 72 ancl 73, 
an<l they had rentecl the water from him, they stood ex-
posed to shame as trespassers and water thieves, with 
no semblance of rights upon which to justify their con-
duct over all the years since 1938 during which they 
have taken the water when it was Hadlock's and Whit-
taker's turns. 
The Price affidavit was not produced by the plain-
tiff. It came into the case from the administrator in his 
cross action against .T ohn Edison and Mrs. Tibbs. 
If it had not been for the false claim which they 
causecl to be set up in the answer of Irwin M. Price to 
our complaint, this case woulcl have been summarily dis-
posed of years ago; for plaintiff would have been en-
titled to judgment on the pleadings against all of the 
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defendants, Tibbs and some of the others being in de-
fault, Indianola Irrigation Company taking about the 
samo position that plaintiff maintained, and Richard 
H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer having disclaimed. 
We feel that a great wrong has been done to all 
parties concerned by the way Richard H. Spencer and 
John Edison Spencer have been permitted to trifle with 
the court and with the rights of others by hiding their 
actions behind the screen of the claim which they as-
serted in behalf of Irwin M. Price. 
It was therefore no little satisfaction to us when, 
without any help from our side, their nefarious con-
duct stood exposed by the filing of the Price affidavit. 
We simply could not help recollecting the old saw, 
that when thieves fall out just men get their dues. 
II. 
Whittaker's Right has not been Lost 
by Nonuser, nor by Adverse 
Possession. 
Appe1lants .John Edison Spenco'r and Elizabeth A. 
Tibbs in their brio[ at page 82 mako the claim that the 
Whittaker right has been acquired by John Edison Spen-
cer by adverse use and lost to plaintiff under Section 
100-1-4, Code, and the doctrine of Earnmond v. John-
son, 94 Utah 20, 66 Pac. (2d) 894. 
In answer to such claim we point out the facts bear-
ing upon the subject. Hadlock was not authorized to use 
the 60 acres of water right until his mortgage was fore-
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closed and the sheriff's deed was issued on the foreclo-
sure sale after the period of redemption had exp~red. 
During all that period the mortgagor had the right to 
the use of the water right. The sheriff's deed is dated 
December 9, 1937, recorded December 16, 1937, which was 
after the irrigation season for that year. So that Hadlock 
was not entitled to use the water until the beginning of 
the irrigation season of 1938. 
There seems to have been no trouble over the use 
of the water in 1938. But when Hadlock and Whittaker 
took it in 1939, 1940 and 1941, in the turns assigned for 
its usc, Richard H. Spencer and John Edison interferred 
with their use of it and took the water away from them. 
rl'h is aeti on was filed in July of 1~)41 to quiet title to 
the right and the right has been in litigation ever since 
that time. 
The foregoing facts do not sustain the claim that 
plaintiff has lost his right by not using it, for he did all 
he could do to make use of it and was prevented by the 
wrongful acts of those defendants. Not being willing to 
resort to the use of force to keep the water in his ditches 
when it was his turn to make usc of it against these two 
trespassers, the plaintiff took the only course open to 
him to protect hi;.; right, namely, he filed his action in 
the district court to quiet his title and get an injunction 
against the defendants to restrain them from interfer-
ing with his use. 
The facts refute the claim of abandonment and ad-
verse title. 
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III. 
Appellants are estopp,ed to claim 
that the Hadlock mortgage is void. 
(a) They are estopped by the mortgage itself. 
Richard H. Spencer executed that mortgage. Appellant 
Richard Leo Spencer, as administrator of the estate of 
Richard H. Spencer, deceased, stands in no better posi-
tion than did his intestate. Since Richard H. Spencer 
is estopped by the mortgage to say that it is void for 
uncertainty, so is his administrator estopped. 
The rule of law under which this estoppel is claimed 
1s the same with respect to a mortgage as to a deed. 
In 21 C. J. 1067, Section 26, the rule is stated in 
this lant,ruage : 
''A person who assumes to convey an estate 
by deed is estopped, as against the grantee, to 
assert anything in derogation of the deed. He will 
not be heanl, for the purpose of defeating the 
title o[ the grantee, to say that at the time of the 
conveyanc(~ l1e had no title, or that none passed by 
the deed, nor can he deny io the deed its full op-
eration and efl'ect as a conveyane0." 
As to mortgages: 21 C. J. 1068, Section 27: 
''Conforming to the general rule a mortgagor 
is estopped to assert anything in derogation of 
the rights which the instrument purports to con-
vey .... " 
The general rule above stated must of necesity be 
the rule here because of the implied covenants in the 
mortgage. 
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The Hadlock mortgage is m the statutory form of 
mortgages in use in this state. 
Section 78-1-13, Code, r~eads in part: 
''Such a mortgage when executed as required 
by law shall have the effect of a conveyance of the 
land therein described .... to the mortgagee, his 
heirs, assigns and 'legal representatives, as securi-
ty for the payment of the indebtedness therein set 
forth, with covenants from the mortgagor of gen-
eral warranty of title .... '' 
What are the covenants of general warranty of title 
mentioned in this statute? 
rrhe answer, we suggest, is found in Section 78-1-11, 
Code, relative to warranty deeds. In this section it is 
provided: 
''Such deed when executed as required by 
law shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee 
simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of 
the premises therein named together with all 
appurtenances, rights and privileges there unto 
belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his 
heirs and personal representatives, that he is law-
fully seised of the premises; that he has good 
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the 
grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet pos-
session thereof; and that the grantor, his heirs 
and personal representatives will forever war-
rant and defend the title thereof in the g-rantee, 
his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims 
whatsoever.'' 
That such are the covenants of general warranty of 
title see also the definitions of "covenants of warranty" 
in Bouvier's Law Dictionary; and 15 C. J. 1230, Sec-
tion 40, under the title "Covenants," where it is said 
that in the United States the usual covenants of title are 
the covenants of seizen, or right to convey, against in-
cumbrances, for quiet 'enjoyment, and of warranty. 
It would indeed be a sad state of affairs if Rich-
ard H. Spencer, or his administrator, or any one claim-
ing under him by a conveyance executed subsequent to 
the date of the Hadlock mortgage, were to be permitted 
to come in at this late date and say that the mortgage is 
void and the mortgagee got no title to the water right 
by the foreclosure of the mortgage and the purchase at 
the sheriff's sale. 
Richard H. Spencer received the consideration for 
which he executed that mortgage. There would be no 
equity or justice in permitting his administrator or 
his children John Edison and Mrs. Tibbs to come in now 
and get the water right on the claim that the mort-
gage is void for uncertainty in the description, the only 
uncertainty claimed being that the description of the 
land to which the right was appurtenant is not included 
in the mortgage. 
In equity and good conscience the appellants ought 
to be estopped. 
(b) The administrator and John Edison are 
estopped by the disclaimers which were filed in answer 
to the complaint of the plaintiff in this action; and we 
think this goes for Mrs. Tibbs also because she is claim-
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mg under her father. Richard H. Spencer's disclaimer 
has never been repudiated by any pleading filed in this 
action. John Edison's disclaimer has never been re-
pudiated by him by any direct action on his part; he 
never did ask the lower court to permit him to withdraw 
that disclaimer or to be relieved from its binding effect. 
But he was permitted over our objection to file certain 
answers which are inconsistent with the disclaimer. 
To disclaim means to disavow, to renunciate. In a 
pleading it means a renunciation by the defendant of all 
claim to the subject of the demand made by the plain-
tiff. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary.) 
John Etlison and Richard H. having renounced and 
disavowed by their verified pleading filed in this action 
all claims to the subject of the demand made by the 
plaintiff, namely, the GO acres of: water right which is 
the suhject of tl1is action, they are now estopped to 
assert that ihe Hadlock mortgage is void and that they 
own tl1is same water right. 
(c) Appellants are all estopped by the record and 
the ;judgment in ease No. 2888 to assert that the Hadlock 
mortgage is voifl for uncertainty in the description of 
the water right. 
The law on which we stand here is found in 21 C. J. 
1 OG3, Section 21, staterl as follows: 
"It is a well establishefl rule that the records 
of a court of justice import absolute verity, and 
no one, whether or not a party to the proceeding 
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in which it was made, may in a collateral proceed-
ing impeach it by adducing evidence in denial of 
the facts of which is purports to be a memorial.'' 
See also 34 C. J. 511, Section 815, from which we 
quote: 
"A judgment by a court having jurisdiction 
of the parties and the subject matter, unless re-
versed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is 
not open contradiction or impeachment, in re-
spect to its validity, verity, or binding effect, by 
parties or privies, in any collateral action or pro-
ceeding, except for fraud in its procurement .... " 
"'rhe reason for the rule that judgments of 
a court of record cannot be called in question in 
a collateral proceeding is one of necessity. The 
basic reason for the rule is founded on the con-
sideration that the regular and orderly way of 
trying tlw validity of judgments is by an appeal or 
other appropriate proceeding in the case itself, 
or under the statute permitting a vacation of 
judgments for certain enumerated reasons." 
Quoted from -Wick v. Rea, :54 Wash. 424, 427, 
10:1 Pac. 4G2. 
Also sec .34 C. J. 859, Section 1262, from which 
we quote: 
''In an action for the recovery of real prop-
erty, or to try title, or to foreclose a mortgage or 
other lien, or for trespass, defendant must set up 
all the titles or claims to the property which he 
holds or can make available in his behalf; failure 
to a:-::sert any title or claim in such action will pre-
clude him from setting it up afterward .... " 
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See also: 34 C. J. 944, Section 1345, from which we 
quote: 
''When the existence and VALIDITY of a de·ed 
or other contract is adjudicated, either being put 
in issue and tried, OR IN THE SENSE OF BE-
ING NECESSARILY DE'TERMINED BY A 
JUDGMENT ENFORCING THE CONTRACT, 
or refusing to set it aside, the question is conclu-
sively settled by the judgment for the purposes of 
all further litigation between the same parties; 
and this rule applies, even though the issue was 
not raised in the action, since in that case the 
judgm·ent necessarily implies a finding that the 
cause of action was valid and enforceable .... " 
The existence and validity of the Hadlock mortgage 
were tendered as issues in case No. 2888. John Edison 
Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs were parties to that ac-
tion; so was Richard H. Spencer a party, and all of 
them were served with summons and Richard H. and 
John :Ejdison were actually present at the trial of that 
case. 
If they had any idea that the Hadlock mortgage was 
void for the uncertainty in the description in the water 
right, they had an opportunity to assert that defense. 
That was the proper time for them to assert it, for then 
the plaintiff could have asked for a reformat~<J'l: of the. 
mortgage if the court had held that th-;AiiorMjwffv-arV 
faulty. They had their day in court on that issue. 
We cite still another statement from 34 C. J. 962, 
this time from Section 1368: 
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''The judgment in a mortgage foreclosure 
suit i::; conclusive of all questions actually tried 
and determined or necessarily involved, includ-
ing title to the premises if that was in i::;sue and 
passed upon. ''.Che general rules as to persons con-
cluded by judgment are applicable to judgments 
in foreclosure proceedings .... '' 
The general rule is found in Section 1405, same vol-
ume: 
"To constitute a judgment an estoppel there 
must be a substantial identity of parties as well 
as of subject matter; that is, it is necessary that 
the parties as between whom the judgment is 
claimed to be an estoppel must have been parties 
to the action in which it was rendered, in the same 
capacities and in the same antagnostic relation, 
or else they must be in privity with the parties in 
such former action .... " 
In that action Hadlock was plaintiff and John Edi-
son and Mrs. Tibbs was defendant and Richard H. Spen-
cer, the intestate who is now represented by the ad-
ministrator, was a defendant. The plaintiff stands in 
this case as plaintiff in the shoes of Hadlock. So that 
ail the conditions for an estoppel are here present. 
The court in No. 2888 found by implication that the 
Hadlock mortgage was a valid instrument and fore-
closed it. lt found that the mortgage covered the 60 
acres of water right which is the subject of this action. 
The court also found as a fact in that case that the 
Hugentobler 55 acres and the Hadlock 60 acres of water 
right were part of the same water right was con-
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veyed by Richard H. Spencer to the Indianola Irrigation 
Company on November 25, 1931, and which supported 
certificates 72 and 73. 
So that we now say that all of the appellants in this 
action are estopped and in good conscience and 'equity 
they ought to be estopped to assert now that the Had-
lock mortgage is void and to assert that the Hadlock 
mortgage covered any other water right than that which 
was conveyed to the irrigation company for the stock 
now represented in 72 and 73. rl1he record and the judg-
ment in case No. 2888 are conclusive against them. 
Counsel in the brief accuses us of aUempting in this 
action to relitigate case No. 2888, which is a surprising 
thing to say; because it is he and not us who has raised 
the issue in this case of the validity of the mortgage. We 
arc only trying in this action to secure the benefits of 
the judgment in that case, to enforce it. We stand on the 
mortgage as written, we stand on the judgment as ren-
dered. \Ve ask for no reformation of the mortgage, for 
it need:,; no reformation. 
IV. 
The issue of the validity of the Hadlock 
mortgage !is res adjudicata. 
In case No. 2888 Hadlock, the state bank commis-
sioner, pleaded his mortgage and prayed for its fore-
closure. 1'hc defendants in that action, who included 
Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer and Eliza-
beth A. Tibbs, were all served with summons in this state. 
After issues had been framed on the pleadings, a trial 
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was had to the court. The court found that the mortgage 
had been ex>ecuted as alleged, that the defendants were 
in default, and the mortgage was foreclosed by the judg-
ment of the court; and the court further found that the 
water rights which were included in the Hugentobler 
and Hadlock mortgages were part of the same water 
rights which were included in the deed to Indianola Ir-
rigation Company and upon which rested the validity of 
eertificates 72 and 73. The court in that case foreclosed 
the right of aU of the defendants in that action, includ-
ing the defendants Richard H. Spencer, John J1.Jdison and 
Elizabeth A. Tibbs, and also the Indianola Irrigation 
Company, in and to the water rights described in the 
Hugentobler and Hadlock mortgages. In other words, 
the court enforced the contract, which necessarily im-
plied an adjudication that the contract or mortgage was 
a valid and binding obligation. 
The law upon which we rely in support of our 
claim that the validity of the Hadlock is res adjudicata 
on these appellants is to be found in 34 C. J. 742, Sec-
tion 11:)4, where the general rule is stated in the fol1ow-
ing language : 
'"!'he doctrine of res judicata, first definite-
h' fontlldatetl in the Dneltt_'ss o[ King~;ton's ease, 
embodies iwo main rules, which may he stated as 
follows: '' 1) 'I' he .T udgment or decree of a court 
o[ competent ;iurisdidion upon the merits con-
cln<les the parties all(l privies to the litigation and 
constitutes a har to a new action or suit involving 
the same cause of action either before the same or 
l 
' 
I 
[! 
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any other tribunal. 2) Any right, fact, or matter in 
issue, and directly adjudicated upon, or NECES-
SAHII,Y INVOLVED IN, the determination of 
an action before a competent court in which a 
judgment or decree is rendered upon the merits 
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and 
cannot again be litigated 'between the parties 
whether the claim or demand, purpose or subject 
matter of the two suits is the same or not .... 
Res Judicata is a rule of universal law prevading 
every well regulated system of jurisprudence, and 
is put upon two grounds, embodied in various 
maxims of the common law; the one, public policy 
and neceBsity, which makes it 'to the interest of 
the state that there should be an end to litiga-
tion .... ; the other, the hardship on the individual 
that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. 
The doctrine applies and treats the final deter-
mination of the action as speaking the infallible 
truth as to the rights of the parties as to the en-
tire subject of the controversy, and such contro-
versy and every part of it must stand irrevocably 
closed by such determination. The sum and sub-
stance of the whole doctrine is that a matter once 
judicially decided is finaUy decided.'' 
A Utah case supporting the proposition that a 
judgment is conclusive as to matters which wer'e or might 
have 'been interposed is Logan City vs. Utah Power 
& Light Co., 86 Utah 340, 16 Pac. 2d. 1097, the syllabus on 
the point being as follows: 
"Judgment is conclusive against party as to 
all matters of defense which were or might have 
been interposed.'' 
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Since these appellants might have interposed the 
defense that the mortgage is void for uncertainty in the 
description of the water right in case No. 2888, and failed 
to make such defense, they are now estopped to set up 
that defense in this action, which is brought only to en-
able the plaintiff to enforce the judgment in that case. 
The defense is not open to them here because the 
judgment is res adjudicata on that defense. 
The validity of the Hadlock mortgage was neces-
sarily invo'lved in case No. 2888; for if it had not been 
found to be a valid mortgage, the court would not hav:e 
foreclosed it. Therefore that judgment speaks the in-
fallible truth as to the right of the plaintiff in that ac-
tion to take Spencer's water right away from him by 
sale on foreclosure and also definitely decides that all 
rights which any of the appellants in this case may have 
had in the water rights described in the mortgage were 
foreclosed. These defendants and appellants are barred 
by that judgment from now asserting that the Hadlock 
mortgage is void. 
It IS almost impossible to imagine a case 
where the undisputed facts sustain a more complete es-
topple by record and judgment and a claim of res ad-
judicata. 
The defendants and appellants in law and equity 
are now barred forever by the record and judgment in 
2888 to assert that the Hadlock mortgage is void. 
Of course, if the mortgage is valid, then all the pro-
ceedings in 2888 are valid; and we will not enter here 
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upon a discussion of that record to sustain our 
position. The only attack on the judgment in that case 
rests upon the assertion that the mortgage is void. 
In his brief counsel for John Edison and Mrs. rribbs 
more than once throws out the charge that we are trying 
to retry No. 2888. About all we can say in answer to 
that charge is that it is he and not us who is trying to 
retry that case by attacking the valjdity of our mort-
gage. All we want to do is to sustain and enforce the 
judgment in that case. We claim under it as it is writ-
ten. Neither are we trying, as he also charges, to reform 
our mortgage. There is no such thought in our minds. 
We stand on the mortgage as written and claim under 
it. All we want the court to do is to read and understand 
that mortgage with the same knowledge and understand-
ing that the parties to it had when they made it con-
cerning the subject matter therein mentioned and the 
meaning of the terms used therein; and to enforce that 
judgment and quiet our title to the water rights and 
enjoin appellants from interfering hereafter with our 
use of it. 
Counsel also makes the suggestion that the parties 
may have intended tho Hadlock mortgage to be a second 
mortgage. But there is nothing at all in the record to 
sustain him in this position. While I have pointed out 
in another connection in this brief that by reason of Sec-
tion 78-1-13 and Section 78-1-11 there is read into the 
Hadlock mortgage a covenant from the mortgagor to 
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the mortgagee that the property therein mortgaged IS 
free from incumbrances. 
v. 
The Hadlock mortgage is not void for ,uncertainty. 
If the Hadlock mortgage be read, as it should be 
read, and understood in accordance with the actual mean-
ing and intention of the parties to it, as manifested in the 
first instance by the terms which they have chosen to 
employ in the instrument itself, in the light of their long 
continued and practical usage and construction; if we 
reacl this mortgage with the knowledge and understand-
ing which the parties to it had of the subject matter of 
their contract, there is nothing uncertain about it. They 
knew and understoo<l that it was intended to cover GO 
acres out of Hichar<l H. Spencer's 448 acres of primary 
or cla::-;s A water right in Thistle creek, which 448 acres 
were a part of a total of 1728 acres of primary or class 
A water right on the stream; and that it was not in-
ten< led to he a pledge of any t'hares of stock. 
There is implicit in the art,rument on the other side 
as the major premise the proposition that a mortgage 
on a water right in this state is void unless it contains 
a description of the land upon which the water right has 
heen used and to which it is appurtenant. 
\V e point out to the court in this connection that no 
court has ever so held. No case or other authority is 
cited by the other ::-;ide and we confidently assert that 
none can be cited which has held that such is the law; 
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for there are many ways in which a water right may be 
described and identified without ev·en mentioning the 
land upon which the water is used. 
It would seem to be unnecessary because it is so 
self evident to point out that a water right is an intang-
ible something, existing only in contemplation of law, 
and hence not capable of being identified and seen or 
appreciated through the means of any of the five senses. 
It is simply a right which a person ~as to go upon a 
stream or source of supply and div;ert therefrom a cer-
tain quantity of water and use it for beneficial pur-
poses. These old rights, which originated by diversion 
and beneficial use long prior to the time there was any 
law in this state which required records to be made of 
them, have practically all been conveyed to irrigation 
companies by deeds no more definite than the deed which 
Spencer made to the Indianola Irrigation Company. 
They are described only with reference to the county in 
which the water is diverted, the name of the stream, 
the name of the owner of the right, the name of the 
grantee, and the number of acre feet or second feet or 
by any one of a number of means of measurement which 
might be employed. The county recorders keep books of 
water transfers, with indexes for the same, so that there 
is a public notice of their execution and of their contents, 
and no one need he misinformed as to the records, so 
far as they may go. But anyone experienced in such mat-
ters will always make special inquiries as to water rights, 
for it is well known that the records of these old rights 
are not all that ·exacting lawyers might want them to be. 
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It would be a serious blow to property rights in 
this state if the court should uphold the appellants' con-
tention with respect to this Hadlock mortgage and with 
respect to the deed to the Indianola Irrigation Company. 
For thousand of dollars in property rights would he 
invalidated by such a holding. 
A water right which is appurtenant to a particular 
tract of land because it is used thereon may be severed 
from the land and thereby cease to he appurtenant. One 
way of effecting a severance is by a deed of conveyance 
of the water right without the land, another way is to 
convey the land and reserve the water right, and still 
another way is to mortgage the water right but not the 
land and then have the mortgage foreclosed. The latter 
is the way the ~everance was accomplished in the case of 
the water right covered by Hadlock's mortgage. The 
severance did not occur, as has been pointed out hereto-
fore, until the execution of the sheriff's deed on the fore-
closure sale. 
See in this connection: 67 C. J. 1038, 1039, 1040, 
1041, subject "\:Vaters:" 
1<-,rom Section 481 we quote: 
"\Vhere possible, without violating the in-
tention of the parties, a contract conveying an 
interest in water will be given such construction 
as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reason-
able, and capable of being carried into effect." 
This also from 67 C. J. 1079, Section 557: 
"Under general rules a grant or reservation 
of water rights should be construed in accordance 
with the actual meaning and intention of the 
parties, as manifested in the first instance hy the 
terms they have chosen to emp'Joy in the instru-
ment of conveyance, which may he read in the 
light of their long continued practical usage or 
construction, and the meaning of which may be 
further elucidated by comparing the various parts 
of the instrument and reading it in connection 
with contemporary or even subsequent deeds or 
contracts relating to the same subject, or consider-
ing contemporaneous circumstances known to the 
parties. The tendency is to adopt that construc-
tion which gives the grantee an unrestricted right 
or privilege, rather than a limited one.'' 
We adopt here because it is as good a statement 
of the law upon this subject as we have found in the 
books the following statement from 36 Am. Jur., Section 
42, found in appellants' brief on pages 5G and 57, rela-
tive to the construction of description;,; of water rights in 
mortgages: 
"In regard to an ambugity in a mortgage, the 
modern tendency is to allow a liberal interpreta-
tion of the description of the property AND TO 
UPHOLD THJ1J VALIDJCI'Y OF THFJ MORT-
GAGE IF IN ANY WAY IT IS POSSIBLE TO 
ARRIVJjJ A'T THE INTJiJNrriON OF r:I'IHJ 
PARTII1JS THERFJTO .... " 
"Furthermore, a description may be suf-
ficient even though it may he necessary on ac-
count of its inperfect or indefinite character to 
aid the intention of the parties by averring and 
proving extrinsic facts. Accordingly, in order to 
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identify the property intended to be mortgaged, 
and to give effect to the intention of the parties 
to the instrument, parol evidence is generally held 
admissibl,e to explain a mistake in description of 
property in a mortgage, or to explain and remove 
any uncertainty." 
See also Payton, et al v. Browning, 290 P. 253, 
wherein 1\fr. Justice Simms, writing for the supreme 
court of New Mexico, states the rule for the construc-
tion of deeds to water rights, and the rule for mortgages 
should be even more liberal, if anything, as follows: 
''In arriving at a correct solution of this 
problem, it is the provience and duty of the court 
to place itself as nearly as possible in the situa-
tion of the parties to the instruments under which 
title is elaimed, and endeavor to <liscover and 
give effect to the intention of the parties. Simp-
son v. Blaisdell, Rfl Me. 1 !l9, 27 A. 101, ;);) Am. 
St. Rep. :148. Much is said in the hooks about 
deeds which are void heeause of uneertainty in 
tl1e deseription of the premises attempted to he 
conveyc<l, hut it is not to he understood that the 
sufrieiency of the description in a deed is to he 
mcasure<l by any inflexible rule m· set of' rules. 
rl'he tost in ever~; ease of contracts other than 
clec<1s, is whctlwr or not the intention of the 
parties can he <liscovered and effectuated." 
\Vhile the Hadlock mortgage has never appeared to 
us to be open to just criticism on account of any defect 
in the description of the water right, yet we knew that 
the attack would be made if the opportunity were pre-
sented; and it is with the foregoing rules of construc-
tion in mind that we drafted the complaint in this action, 
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incorporating therein the allegations of matters of in-
ducement and background which l1elp to an understand-
ing of the situation in which the parties stood and which 
help to correct understanding of the meaning of the 
terms which the parties used in the mortgage to de-
scribe the 60 acres which Richard H. Spencer intended 
to give to the bank commissioner as security for the 
payment of his debt. All these matters are either ad-
mitted in the pleadings or were found to be true by the 
court from the evidence and are now incorporated in 
the findings of fact. 
Is it possible for any one, except a lawyer who is 
trying to find a way out for his client, to read the com-
plaint and the findings of fact in this case and not know 
to a reasonable certainty that Spencer intended to mort-
gage 60 acres out of his 448 acres which he had not 
mcfr"tga_qed ~r %any I~l el,;e b.~:-1~e~ed to mort-
~ll'i28 acres of s4ch~ .c) I v ' 
.// ..;'/ 
"Sixty acres of water right." That is a;,; certain 
and definite as it can be. The parties knew, and we now 
know, since witnesses have given testimony in this case, 
that 60 acres of water right means the right to take 
water from Thistle creek in turns with the other users 
for a definite number of minutes, at definite length 
of time between turns, in rotation with the users having 
in all 1729 acres of such rights. 
The parties knew, as we now know, that according 
to the practices which have been established among the 
water users, the water master on the stream each sea-
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son notifies ·each user when his turns come and how 
long to keep the use of the water. No man's rights are 
unlimited but they are all qualified by the rights of all 
other users on the stream. 
The water master does not tell Spencer: It is your 
turn now to use the water which was decreed to you be-
cause you owned the Jim Ownup farm or any other 
farm. He simply tells Spencer when his turn comes to 
use the water, and Spencer uses it on any land he pleases. 
The place where he used the water is not important. 
'The turns when he may use it and the length of his 
turns are the important factors because those factors 
must be made to mesh in with the same factors pertain-
ing to the rights of all others on Thistle creek to the end 
that each water user will get his just share of the avail-
able supply according to his rights. These factors are 
a:-; certain as arithmetic can make them, for there are 
1728 acres or shares of class A or primary rights on 
r:l'histle creek, Spencer owned 448 shares or acres of them, 
and he mortgaged 60 shares or acres thereof to Hadlock. 
The source of supply is certain-Thistle creek; the 
county in which the diversion is made is certain-San-
pete; the state is certain-Utah; the ownership is cer-
tain-Richard H. Spencer; the grantee is certain-Had-
lock, the bank commissioner; the (ruantity is certain GO-
shares or acres, which we know means 60 out of 448 
acres which Spencer owned and which he had not there-
tofore mortgaged. vVe also know that the 60 acres mort-
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gaged to Hadlock did not include any water right used 
on the lands in Section 3, because the mortgage says so. 
If \Ve follow the law which we have quoted from 
Judge Hansen's brief, and uphold the validity of this 
mortgage if any way is possible to arrive at the inten-
tion of the parties thereto, we have no difficulty what-
ever when we read it in the light of the extrinsic facts 
which arc shown by undisputed evidence and indeed 
which are admitted by all parties concerned and which 
have been found by the court in its findings of facts to 
be true. 
In the light of that evidence and those findings, we 
know for a certainty that Spencer mortgaged 60 acres of 
the only water right which he owned and which was 
not then encumbered by liens of prior mortgages to 
Hugentobler and Federal, and that the same was a part of 
the water right which had been decreed to him in the 160 
acres in the vVansits farm in Section 5 and the city lot 
of 3 acres. 
If there could be said to be any uncertainty in re-
gard to \vhat water right Spencer intended. to mortgage, 
all such uncertainty has been removed by Richard H. 
Spencer and John Edison Spencer themselves, for they 
have claimed at all times and. the appellants now claim 
that the only water right which was not then mortgaged 
when the Hadlock mortgage was executed was the 160 
acres on the Wansits farm in Section 5 and the 3 acres 
of city lot water. ,T ohn EcUson Spencer himself so testi-
fied. 
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It so heppens, as tho court found in case No. 2888 
and also in this case, to be a part of the same right which 
was allocated to Spencer in the decree of 1920 in case No. 
1406, and which Spencer conveyed by deed to the irriga-
tion company on November 25, 1931, and upon which 
the irrigation company issued the certificate which later 
became certificates 72 and 73. 
There is no doubt or question about the foregoing. 
There is no one way in which to describe a water 
right in a mortgage. It might be a good way, indeed it 
might even be the best way, to tie the description of the 
right to a description by metes and bounds of the lands 
upon which the right is appurtenant. But parties do not 
have to use the best way. Often they do not. It is the duty 
of the courts to accept the way which has been employed 
by the parties and then try to find out from their writ-
ings, road and understood in the light of the knowledge 
which the parties have of the subject matter of their con-
tract and of tho surrounding circumstances and with the 
same knowledge which tho parties had of the moaning of 
tho language which they employed, and then to give ef-
fect if possible to their contracts. 
1\Iost deeds and mortgages to water rights in this 
state, we venture to assert, which are not intended to 
include also the lands upon which the waters are used, 
contain no description by metes and bounds or legal sub-
divisions of the lands. 
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The deed from Spencer to the Indianola Irrigation 
Company does not. The deed from Federal to the In-
dianola Irrigation Company does not. 
All the shares in this corporation which are now out-
standing are based upon deeds of conveyance which do 
not describe any land. 
A casual glance through the records of water con-
veyances in this county, or in any other county of the 
state, will disclose hundreds, yes, thousands, of convey-
ances of water rights in which no land is described. 
Most such conveyances simply mention the name of 
the grantor, the county in which the right is exercised, 
the name of the grantee, the source of supply, and then 
in some manner identify the water right by some appro-
priate description as to second feet or acre feet and so 
on. 
In his brief counsel for appellants state that it is not 
clear whether the validity of the mortgage should be 
tested by the law relating to real estate or to personal 
property, and so he proceeds to test it by both. 
It looks very much like an absurdity to test it by the 
law relating to personal property, since we all know it 
must be tested by the law relating to the real estate, so 
far as possible. 
In making the test by the law of personal property 
counsel refer to the case of Jacobsen v. Christiansen, 18 
Utah 149, 65 P. 562, holding that a mortgage is void for 
uncertainty which describes 500 sheep bearing certain 
39 
marks and brands and the evidence m the case showed 
that the mortgagor had a larger number of sheep in the 
herd bearing the same marks and brands. 
Since counsel has brought in that case and cites the 
law of chattels, we answer by calling the court's atten-
tion to some more of the law of chattels. 
In 11 C. J., page 464, Sec. 84(2), we read: 
"vVhore the mortgaged chattels are of uni-
form quality and value, such as are ascertained 
hy weight, measure, or count, and the constituent 
parts, which make up the mass, are not dis-
tinguished by any physical difference in size, 
shape, or quality, a mortgage of a part of the 
undivided whole is valid for all purposes." 
~ince 4--!8 acres of primary water right has no parts 
and one aero is exactly like another, if there may be said 
to he likeness relative to things which have no substance, 
we think the law o[ chattels which we have cited above 
suppli(•s tho test, if' the law relative to personal property 
is to he applied. ~o applying it, the mortgage covers 
G0/-~48t1Js of Npencer's water right, and under that law 
tl1e mortga§..!;e must he sustained. 
In making the test by the law of real property coun-
sel cites ca:-;es and authorities holding that descriptions 
of real estate must he so eertain that an officer can take 
the writ or instrument and iclentify the land, point out 
iis houmlaries and put tho trespasser out and the lawful 
0 • 
owner m possessiOn. 
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But such descriptions cannot be made for water 
rights. A water right is intangible. It has no boundaries. 
It cannot be seen. It exists only in contemplation of law 
like a corporation. No officer could take a writ for a 
water right and go out and find such right. He could 
find out who is using water from a certain stream at a 
certain time, just as we did when we went to Thistle 
valley and found out that the Spencers were taking the 
water in the turns which had been set aside for us. 
Just because descriptions which are appropriate for 
tracts of land cannot be used in describing water rights, 
which have no substance, the authorities which are cited 
by the other side on this subject are not controlling. 
Counsel says that the sheriff could not find the Whit-
taker water right and that we went up there and looked 
for it but could not find it. Our answer is that we knew 
better than to look for a water right which we knew 
we could not see. \Vhat the sheriff looked for and what 
we looked for and what the sheriff found and what we 
found was who was taking the water out of our ditches 
when we were trying to make use of it in the turns which 
had been set aside for our use. vV e found exactly what 
we were looking for, namely Richard H. and .John Edi-
son, taking the water from us and we sued them. 
Ever since the day when the pioneers first turned 
the waters of City Creek upon the potato patches which 
they planted in their new Zion right down to the present 
time water rights in this country have been measured and 
described by fractional parts of the whole source of 
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supply, and by fractional parts with limitations as to the 
periods of time when used; just as the water users in 
Thistle valley have always distributed and measured 
their rights in Thistle creek. 
See Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, Vol. 11, page 135, 
from which we quote: 
"'The right to the use of water may be meas-
ured by fractional parts of the whole source of 
supply, or by fractional parts, with limitation as 
to periods of time when used.'' 
The standard unit of measurement since we adopted 
the ~Wyoming Code in 19'19 has been the second foot. 
(Sec. 100-1-2, Code.) But it is a simple problem in arith-
metic, after the stream has been divided into ditches ac-
cording to the fractional parts thereof owned by the 
water users, to measure the parts by the cubic foot stand-
ard. The custom still persists of describing water rights 
in decrees, deeds, mortgages and contracts just exactly 
as they have been described from time immemorial by 
the fanners in Indianola and as they are described in 
Hadloek's mortgage. This custom will likely endure 
long aft(~r our day. It has become habitual with our 
people. "l'here is no reason why they should be required 
to give it up. It has worked out all right so far and will 
likely continue to meet with the needs of the people. 
So why try to change it~ It takes some engineering skill 
an(l more accurate measuring devices than are generally 
in use to measure small streams by the second foot; 
but practical farmers with their crude dams and home 
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made ditches do pretty well when it comes to dividing 
the stream among themselves, or when they have their 
water masters do it, by fractional part. 
At page 66 in the brief counsel cites four Utah cases 
which he says sustain his argument that the Hadlock 
mortgage is void for uncertainty in the description of 
the water right. But a glance at those cases will dis-
close that none of them is in point to this case because 
they all differ in their facts. 
In Elliott v. Whitmone, 8 Utah 254, 30 P. 984, the 
supreme court remanded the case for a new trial so that 
the lower court could take evidence regarding a 
number of facts which had to be found before a proper 
decree could be made. There is nothing in the case of aid 
here, either as regards the validity of the mortgage or the 
decree in No. 2888. 
In Smith v. Phillips, 6 Utah 376, 23 P. 932, the water 
right in the decree is described as a good irrigation 
stream. On appeal the court held this description to be 
indefinite and uncertain and remanded. 
In Nephi Irrigation Co. v. Vickers, 15 Utah :174, 49 
P. 301, the trial court found and decreed: "That d.efend-
ant is the owner and has the right to use sufficient of 
the waters of Hot creek to irrigate 30 acres of land." 
This was held to be uncertain and the case was remanded 
to the lower court to hear evidence and find and deter-
mine the amount of water, in second feet, or fractional 
parts of the stream of water. rrhis description is not the 
same as ours and hence the case is not in point. 
In Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 168 P. 273, the 
decree on collateral attack was held void for uncertainty. 
The attempt had been made to describe the right by giv-
ing the capacity of the ditch. But neither the grade of 
the ditch nor the velocity of the water was given, so it 
was impossible with factors stated to measure the flow. 
As the method used in that case is not the method used 
here, the case is not in point. 
We have stated that a water right may be described 
in many different ways. 
For example see: 
Middle Cut Ditch Co. vs. Henry, 15 Mont. 558, 39 P. 
1054, \vhich is cited in G7 C .• J. 10i38, Sec. 479, \vhere it was 
held that an instrument whereby the appropriator does 
give and grant his water right is sufficient as a convey-
ance of the usufruct of the water. 1'he land \Vas not de-
scribed. 
II we apply in this case the test \vhich the supreme 
court of' New Mexico sayH in the case cited in tJw begin-
ning of this part of our brief \Ve must apply, namely, to 
discover and give effect to the intention of the parties, 
then this mortgage lllllHt he ;:.;ustained. It i;:.; dear that 
Spencer inten<1ed to mortgage something in addition to 
the land an<l the water right appurtenant thereto in Sec-
tion :1, for it is Ho ;:.;tatecl in the mortgage. It is clear that 
he intended to mortgage GO acres of his mvn water right 
of the primary or Class A type. It is clear that he in-
tended to mortgage part of his 448 acres of decreed right. 
It is clear that his right was to the use of the waters of 
Thistle Creek, in this county. It is beyond question, not-
withstanding counsel's assertion to the contrary, that 
Spencer did not intend this to be a second mortgage but 
that he did intend it to be a first mortgage on the 60 
acres of primary water right. It is beyond all question, 
for counsel say so in their brief on page 63, that the water 
right here involved was always used on Sections 5 and 
8 and no part of it was ever used on Section 3, and that, 
since the water right which was used on Section 8, the 
Old Jim or Jim Ownup farm, went to Federal and under-
lies certificates 84 and 86, the water right which was 
mortgaged to Hadlock must have been that used on Sec-
tion 5, tl1e \Vansits farm. Such is also John ljjdison 's tes-
timony. It is clear that Spencer did not intend to mort-
gage to the bank commissioner any of the water rights 
which he had theretofore mortgaged to Hugentobler and 
Federal. It cannot be questioned that he owned 448 acres 
of primary water right out of 1728 acres of such rights 
on Thistle creek and that he intended to mortgage 60 
acres out of those 448 acres. It is clear that Hadlock 
intended to get as security a first mortgage on the 60 
acres of water right which Richard H. Spencer owned 
in addition to the other security described in the mort-
gage. It is a simple matter for the water master to make 
out the tickets each season for the users of the primary 
water rights and to tell Whittaker when his turns come 
in rotation with the turns of the users. It is not diffi-
cult to enforce this decree, now that we have Price and 
the false claim which John Edison and his father have 
been making in his name out of the picture. If John 
Edison takes the water hereafter when it is Whittaker's 
turn, he can be cited into court in a minute and punished 
for contempt and also sued for damages. It is not dif-
ficult to identify the water right, for John Edison has 
put up a stay bond in this appeal and is now using the 
water1:3 when it is our turn under the decree to use them. 
We shall not refer specifically to the part of the 
argument which attacks the validity of the judgment in 
case No. 2888. If our mortgage is not void, or if the mat-
ter is res adjudicata, or if the appellants are estopped 
to attack the mortgage, then the decree is valid. 
We wish to call attention to who is not attacking the 
judgment in this case and who is attacking it. The ln-
dianola Irrigation Company is not attacking; neither 
is Que Jensen, the successor of Hugentobler; neither is 
Richard H. Spencer, who is dead and whose disclaimer 
still stands; neither is the plaintiff. John Edison is at-
tacking it, right in the face of the disclaimer which he 
filed to our complaint; Elizabeth A. Tibbs is attack-
ing it, right in the face of her default in this case, which 
stood until her present counsel became interested in the 
case; and the administrator of the -estate of Richard 
H. Spencer, deceased, is attacking it, right in the face 
of the disclaimer which his intestate filed and which 
still stands. 
We are not concerned with the lawsuit which was 
carried on among the Spencer defendants and Mrs. 'Tibbs. 
Since they are all foreclosed in this action as they were 
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in case No. 2888 of their rights to our water rights, any 
rights which any of them may have being subordinate 
to the date of our mortgage it mattGrs nothing to ·whit-
taker who gets certificatesW4 andf6 and what is left in 
72 and 7:3 after those certificates are cancelled. Neither 
are we concerned with the question which is argued at 
length in the brief as to whether the water rights are 
appurtenant to the lands. Our rights were severed from 
the land when the Hadlock mortgage was foreclosed and 
the sheriff's deed on foreclosure was delivered to Had-
lock. 
VI. 
At pages 53 and 54 of their brief appellants 
assert that the court erred in awarding Whittaker 
60/1728ths of the stream and Que Jensen 55/1728ths 
thereof. 
The argument on this point is based upon Article 5 
of the articles of incorporation of the Indianola Irriga-
tion Company, which describes the Class A and the Class 
B stock of that corporation. 
Since neither the ·whittaker right nor the Que J en-
sen right is in the corporation and has not been in the 
corporation since the decree was rendered in case No. 
2888, and hence is not subject to the regulations pre-
scribed by its articles of incorporation, the argument is 
not valid. 
There has not been and there will not be any dif-
ficulty in the distribution of the water rights in this 
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respect. Whittaker and Que Jensen have no controversy 
with the Indianola Irrigation Company over this mat-
ter, and that corporation represents all of the water 
rights on the stream except theirs. There will be no im-
pairment of the Class B. rights, in any event, for the 
water will continue to be distributed just as it has al-
ways been distributed among the water users. 
Furthermore, the appellants have not shown how 
the judgment will in this particular is any concern of 
theirs, for they own no class B rights which might be 
adversely affected. 
VII. 
The Costs 
Appellants John E<lison and l\f rs. Tibbs complain 
hecaus<:) the court awarded plaintiff judgment for costs 
against them. 
~'his was <lone no douht hecause these defendants 
W<~re the only ]>nrtiPs to the action -..vho contesteil the 
plaintiff's claim. It wm; apparent to tht) court from the 
pleadings and from the procee<lings before the court that 
but for the <lefense of these two defendants, the case 
wonl<l Jmve gone m favor oi the plaintiff on his com-
plaint without any contest. In fact, :Mrs. Tibbs was in 
deiault and J olm 1£dison was hound by his disclaimer 
until well along in the trial, when the court permitted 
them to come in and defend on the ground that the Whit-
taker mortgage was void. 
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The plaintiff prevailed against all defendants so 
that he was entitled to his costs. (Section 104-44-2, Code.) 
It was within the discretion of the court as to which of 
the defendants should be requir·ed to pay them. (Sec-
tion 104-44-4, Code.) No abuse of discretion is shown in 
this respect. 
We have answered all the criticism which have been 
directed at the judgment in the plaintiff's favor. 
It is respectfully submitted: 
1. That the plaintiff's mortgage Is not void for 
uncertainty in the description of the water right therein 
mortgaged, just because the mortgage contains no de-
scription by metes and bounds or legal subdivisions of 
the land upon which Richard H. Spencer used his water 
right. 
2. That the record and judgment in case No. 2888 
is not void for uncertainty in the description of the mort-
gaged water right, nor for any other reason. 
3. That the record in this case shows that the 
plaintiff's mortgage takes priority over all claims of 
all of the defendants in this action, except Que J en-
sen's, and hence that the decree properly forecloses all 
such claims. 
4. That appellants are estopped by the mortgage, 
by their pleadings in this case, and by the record and 
judgment in case No. 2888 to assert that plaintiff's mort-
gage is void. 
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5. That the validity of the Hadlock mortgage is res 
adjudicata, having been decided in case No. 2888 to 
which appellants were parties. 
6. That there is no prejudicial error shown in this 
record on appeal. 
7. That the judgment appealed from does justice 
and equity between the plaintiff on the one side and 
all of the defendants, including appellants, on the other; 
and hence the judgment in favor of the plaintiff should 
in all respects be affililled. 
8. That this respondent should be awarded his 
costs on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V. VERNON ERICKSON 
DILWORTH WOOLLEY 
Attorneys for Res1p,ondent 
JAMES C. WHITTAKER. 
